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Abstract
Tononi et al. claim that their integrated information theory of consciousness makes testable predictions. This article discusses two
of the more startling predictions, which follow from the theory’s claim that conscious experiences are generated by inactive as well
as active neurons. The first prediction is that a subject’s conscious experience at a time can be affected by the disabling of neurons
that were already inactive at that time. The second is that even if a subject’s entire brain is “silent,” meaning that all of its neurons
are inactive (but not disabled), the subject can still have a conscious experience. A few authors have noted the implausibility of these
predictions—which I call the disabling prediction and the silent brain prediction—but none have considered whether they are testable.
In this article, I argue that they are not. In order to make this case, I first try to clarify the distinction between active, inactive (i.e.
silent), and inactivated (i.e. disabled) neurons. With this clarification in place, I show that, even putting aside practical difficulties, it is
impossible to set up a valid test of either the disabling prediction or the silent brain prediction. The conditions of the tests themselves
are conditions under which a response from the subject could not reasonably be interpreted as evidence of consciousness or change
in consciousness.
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Integrated information theory and the role
of silent neurons
In a series of articles beginning in 2004, Giulio Tononi has
maintained that, on his integrated information theory (IIT),
consciousness is generated by inactive as well as active
neurons.
In particular, Tononi has presented two striking predictions
about the role of inactive, or “silent,” neurons. The first is that a
subject’s conscious experience at a time can be affected by the
disabling of neurons that were already inactive at that time. Call
this the “disabling prediction.” The second prediction takes the role
of inactive neurons even further. It is that even if a subject’s entire
brain is “silent,” meaning that all of its neurons are inactive (but
not disabled), the subject can still have a conscious experience.
Call this the “silent brain (SB) prediction.”
Tononi et al. have increasingly emphasized the testability of
IIT’s predictions. As Tononi and Koch (2015) put it, “A theory is
the more powerful the more it makes correct predictions that violate prior expectations” (p. 9; see also Oizumi et al. 2014; Tononi
et al. 2016). Actually conducting tests, however, is not easy. Tononi

(2017) says that so far, some simple predictions have been tested
“only in an indirect and approximate manner, while others are in
principle testable but technically demanding” (p. 251).
The disabling prediction and the SB prediction have drawn
skepticism, but only for being counterintuitive (Fekete and Edelman 2011; Edelman and Fekete 2012; Klein 2019; Brette 2022;
Pennartz 2022). Here, I consider whether they are testable.
As its name implies, IIT says that consciousness results from
the integration of information. The relevant notion of information is causal and intrinsic. The more states a system S has (this
is the “information”), the greater its capacity for consciousness;
however, for that capacity to be realized, S’s components must
interact (the “integration”). If S is composed of elements e1 –en ,
then S contains integrated information to the extent that e1 –en
influence each other. If (say) e1 ’s state is independent of those
of e2 –en , then e1 generates no information for S. However, if a
state of e1 constrains the past and future states of e2 –en (i.e. making some more likely and others less likely), then that state of
e1 generates information for S about its own past and future
states.
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Roughly, IIT identifies S’s conscious state with the state that
has the densest causal interdependence among its elements—
what is called the “maximally irreducible cause–effect repertoire.”
The set of elements that specifies this repertoire is called a “main
complex.”
IIT is very abstract. Empirical theories of consciousness usually
appeal directly to neural activity. IIT does not. Its framework of
“axioms” and “postulates” is set up in purely phenomenological
and mathematical terms. Canonically, the system elements are
just logic gates.
It is also a vastly non-trivial task to apply IIT to a physical
entity, such as the brain. One must specify the spatial extent, spatial grain, and temporal grain of the system, and the states of the
elements. Ideally, these choices would be made via analysis of all
possible decompositions of an entity, to identify the one with the
maximally irreducible cause–effect repertoire. However, as Tononi
et al. admit, such an analysis is possible only for toy networks (e.g.
Oizumi et al. 2014). Concerning the brain, then, they have so far
simply conjectured that the elements are neurons, and that qua
elements, neurons have two states: active or inactive.
This conjecture then entails the disabling and SB predictions.
In the IIT framework, active and inactive neurons can be equally
relevant to the brain’s cause–effect repertoire. To see why, it helps
to think of a neuron’s two states as simply 𝛼 and 𝛽. Calling them
“active” and “inactive,” or even “on” and “off” (as Tononi et al. themselves often do), is misleading, as these names connote one state
that “does something” and another that “does nothing.” IIT denies
that connotation. A neuron’s inactivity is just as informative as
its activity, for “[i]nactive elements of a complex specify a cause–
effect repertoire (the probability of possible past and future states)
just as much as active ones” (Tononi and Koch 2015, 10).
So, IIT in itself entails nothing about the role of silent neurons. It says nothing about neurons, and there is no such thing
as a “silent” element. The two predictions arise only if silence is
an informationally relevant neural state. This could turn out to be
false. It could turn out that only active neural states specify a maximally irreducible cause–effect repertoire. So, it is more accurate to
say that IIT permits the disabling and SB predictions, rather than
directly entailing them. Nevertheless, permitting them is startling
enough.
Crucially, IIT also says nothing about signals between elements. It thus rejects “the common assumption that neurons only
contribute to consciousness if they are active in such a way that
they ‘signal’ or ‘broadcast’ the information they represent” (Tononi
and Koch 2015, 9). Consciousness is not the result of neurons signaling other neurons, as it is in most empirical theories, but rather
of neural states occupying positions in a cause–effect state space.
IIT is thus agnostic about the processes or mechanisms by
which the elements of a physical system affect each other. It
is enough that they display causal interdependence. The cause–
effect repertoire of a physical system is just a matter of the
influence of each state of each element on the probability of the
system’s past and future states:

Cause–effect power can be established by considering a cause–
effect space with an axis for every possible state of a physical
system in the past (causes) and future (effects). Within this
space, it is enough to show that an “intervention” that sets
the system in some initial state (cause), keeping the state of
the elements outside the system fixed (background conditions),
can lead with probability above chance to its present state;
conversely, setting the system to its present state leads with

probability above chance to some other state (effect). (Tononi
2017, 245)

In this way, IIT is similar to philosophical theories of consciousness, which are also characteristically silent on the operations of
the physical substrate. As I will mention below, at least some of
those theories entail the disabling prediction and perhaps the SB
prediction too.

The disabling prediction and the silent
brain prediction
Tononi (2004) offers a simple scenario to illustrate IIT’s main
implications. Imagine that you face a large screen. When turned
on, it shows a homogeneous blue field. Activity in your brain’s
visual afferent pathways leads to the firing of blue-selective neuronal groups. You have been instructed to press a button when you
see the blue field; so, the blue-selective activity in turn leads to the
activation of motor pathways, which causes you to press the button. Meanwhile, many other neuronal groups, in the visual area
and elsewhere, remain unaffected by the blue percept. Some are
not firing; others are firing in order to serve a multitude of other
functions.
Tononi says that IIT “makes several claims that lead to associated predictions” (Tononi 2004, 18) concerning this scenario. The
most significant claim is that a neuron contributes to consciousness at a time if and only if it belongs to the main complex at that
time. Therefore, blue-selective neurons are inside the main complex that specifies your conscious experience, whereas neurons
in the afferent and efferent pathways, and those in many other
parts of the brain, are not. However, the claim also entails that the
activated, blue-selective neurons are not the only ones that contribute to your blue experience. As Tononi says, “the other groups
of neurons within the main complex are essential to our conscious
experience of blue even if, as in this example, they are not activated” (p. 19). The very inactivity of such neurons helps specify
the informational structure of the main complex. This claim, in
turn, entails the disabling prediction:
Imagine that, starting from an intact main complex, we were to
remove one element after another, except for the active, blueselective one. If an inactive element contributing to “seeing red”
were removed, blue would not be experienced as blue anymore,
but as some less differentiated color, perhaps not unlike those
experienced by certain dichromats. If further elements of the
main complex were removed, including those contributing to
shapes, to sounds, to thoughts and so forth, one would soon
drop to such a low level of consciousness that “seeing blue”
would become meaningless: the “feeling” (and meaning) of the
quale “blue” would have been eroded down to nothing. (Tononi
2004, 19)

The prediction, in short, is that removing inactive neurons from
the main complex will affect the subject’s conscious experience
at the very time of the removal.
The scenario has since been modified to involve temporarily “inactivating” inactive neurons rather than removing them
(Tononi 2008, 2009; Balduzzi and Tononi 2009; Tononi and Koch
2015): hence my name, the “disabling” prediction. The difference
between “inactivity” and “inactivation” is crucial. An inactive neuron still contributes to consciousness. In the neutral framing I
suggested earlier, it is simply in state 𝛽 rather than 𝛼 but could
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transition to 𝛼 if needed. An inactivated (/disabled) neuron, by contrast, contributes nothing to consciousness because it generates
no (intrinsic) information. That is because it is not responsive to
the states of other elements.
Even more recently, Tononi has added that the disabling prediction applies to cases in which one simply disables the connections
between the neurons:

IIT predicts that changes in the efficacy of the connections
among elements of the [physical substrate of consciousness]
should lead to changes in experience even when these changes
are not accompanied by changes in activity. A counterintuitive consequence of this prediction is that a brain area could
contribute to an experience even if it is inactive but not if
its connections or neurons are inactivated. Thus topographic
visual areas would create visual space even in the absence of
spiking activity but not if the horizontal connections within
those areas are inactivated. Similarly, if the connections of neurons in colour areas are intact, the neurons would contribute to
experience even if they are silent, by specifying negative colour
concepts, such as when seeing a picture in black and white.
However, if the connections are damaged, they would not specify any colour concepts, as with certain achromatopsic patients
who do not even understand that the picture is missing colour.
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IIT predicts that, even if all the neurons in a main complex
were inactive (or active at a low baseline rate), they would still
generate consciousness as long as they are ready to respond to
incoming spikes. An intriguing possibility is that a neurophysiological state of near-silence may be approximated through
certain meditative practices that aim at reaching a state of
“pure” awareness without content. (Oizumi et al. 2014, 17)

Other presentations of the SB prediction are found in Balduzzi and
Tononi (2009), Tononi (2015, 2017), Tononi et al. (2016), and Tononi
and Koch (2015).
In my view, part of what makes the disabling and SB predictions interesting is that they are not specific to IIT. I agree with
Fekete and Edelman (2011) that the “problem of silent units,” as
they call it (i.e. the puzzle of how inactive parts of a system
could contribute to its consciousness), is quite general. Any theory
that pictures consciousness as an abstract property—not inherently biological or even physical—entails the disabling and SB
predictions. Earlier, I noted IIT’s similarity to philosophical theories of consciousness. Philosophers Maudlin (1989) and Antony
(1994) criticized computationalist and functionalist theories of
consciousness, respectively, for entailing the disabling prediction.1
Tononi, to his credit, recognizes the entailment and forthrightly
embraces its consequences.

(Tononi et al. 2016, 459–60)

This variation on the disabling scenario accords with the core IIT
principle that what matters to consciousness is the influence of
elements on each other. One way to prevent that influence is to
disable the elements themselves. However, another is to just cut
them off from each other. Either way, the cause–effect repertoire
of the system will be altered.
This variation emphasizes that for IIT, a system’s counterfactual states—the states it could have occupied had different input
been received—are crucial. In Tononi’s original example, elements
that would contribute to a red experience are removed while the
subject is experiencing blue. Applying the most recent variation
of the scenario to this example, the disabling prediction is that we
can alter or cancel the blue experience just by disabling the connections of the “red” elements to the rest of the system. The system
still moves through the same series of actual states because the
“red” elements were not going to be called on to change their states
anyway. However, the experience is nevertheless different than it
would have been, just because of the fact that if those elements
had been called on to change their states (e.g. if the screen had
switched to red), they would not have done so.
Tononi et al. themselves emphasize how counterintuitive this
prediction is (as in the above quote from Tononi et al. 2016). The SB
prediction is even more counterintuitive. It posits consciousness
in a brain in which no neurons at all are active, except at baseline.
This SB state must not be confused with comatose, vegetative, or minimally conscious states. These result from severe brain
injury and thus involve widespread disabling of neural function
(e.g. Laureys et al. 2004). By contrast, the SB state involves no injury
at all.
The SB prediction says “that a brain where no neurons were
activated, but were kept ready to respond in a differentiated manner to different perturbations, would be conscious (perhaps that
nothing was going on)” (Tononi 2004, 19–20). As with the disabling
prediction, the SB prediction has been regularly presented in subsequent publications, usually along with the idea that meditation
might enable such a state of “naked awareness.” For example:

Testability of the disabling and SB
predictions: the general challenge
Notoriously, testing for consciousness is difficult because of the
unobservability of the phenomenon. Behavioral responses to
external stimuli are the standard measure. Neurophysiological
responses are also used, typically via a prior correlation with a
behavioral response. In both cases, the logic is that the observable
response allows us to infer the occurrence of a conscious state that
was the cause of (or in some neurophysiological cases, was identical to) the response. However, many responses can be caused
by (or identical to) a non-conscious state rather than a conscious
one. The challenge, then, is to distinguish responses that indicate
a conscious state from ones that do not.
However, the disabling and SB predictions seem to pose an
extra challenge. This is because the conditions of the test itself
would seem to exclude the possibility of any response, and therefore the mere occurrence of a response would imply that the test
itself was invalid.
The challenge is most apparent for the SB prediction. If a person’s entire brain were silent, responses to stimuli would seem
to be excluded ex hypothesi. Neurophysiological responses would
surely show that the subject was not in the SB state; and if the
subject were to respond behaviorally, one would assume that the
movement was initiated by brain activity of some kind—meaning,
again, that the SB state was not in effect.
As for the disabling prediction, the disablement is seemingly
supposed to involve no change in brain activity. If so, then there
would be no detectable neurophysiological response and there
would be nothing to cause the subject to respond behaviorally. So,
any response that did occur should lead us to conclude that the
testing conditions were not met.

1
For discussion of Maudlin, see Klein (2008), Bartlett (2012), and Klein
(2019); and of Antony, see Bartlett (2014). It is less clear whether these theories
entail the SB prediction; for related discussion, see Bartlett (2018). (In Bartlett
(2012) I suggested that a scenario very similar to the disabling prediction could
be used to test the thesis that consciousness supervenes on actual physical
activity. I have changed my mind.)
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I must immediately emphasize that these brief glosses are
too quick. The testing conditions for the two predictions do not
exclude all possible responses. Even the SB state does not involve
total neurological immobilization, so the subject could in principle respond. However, I will argue that to do so, they must emerge
from the SB state; so even if the response itself indicates a conscious cause, we cannot safely identify the SB state as having
been that cause. So, the response could not be taken to show
that the subject had been conscious while in the SB state. I will
also argue that similar problems afflict the testing of the disabling
prediction.
However, some subtle issues must be resolved in order to make
these claims stick. In particular, we need to clarify what Tononi
means by “silent” or “inactive” neurons.

Distinguishing active, inactive, and
inactivated neurons
A “silent” or “inactive” neuron is not completely inactive. Unlike logic
gates, neurons must undergo constant activity. To remain alive
and functional, they must maintain metabolism and resting membrane potential. Tononi has increasingly acknowledged this fact.
In Balduzzi and Tononi (2009) and Oizumi et al. (2014), the concept
of inactivity is qualified by reference to a “baseline rate” of activation. More recently, the SB prediction has been framed in terms
of the cortex being “almost” or “nearly” silent (Tononi 2015, 2017;
Tononi et al. 2016). IIT now moots a set of “background conditions”
in the brain, which are “[f]actors that enable consciousness, such
as neuromodulators and external inputs that maintain adequate
excitability” (Tononi et al. 2016, 452; see also Oizumi et al. 2014,
esp. Suppl. Text 2).
What, then, does Tononi mean when he refers to “silent” or
“inactive” neurons? What distinguishes an “active” neuron (which
contributes to consciousness), an “inactive” neuron (which also
contributes), and an “inactivated” neuron (which does not contribute)?
As I have noted, Tononi rejects the assumption that neurons
contribute to consciousness only if they are signaling other neurons. I think that this is the key to the difference between activity,
inactivity, and inactivation. Tononi often indicates that by calling a
neuron “inactive,” he means that it is not signaling or broadcasting
to other neurons. For example:

neurons. Note carefully: it is the ability to signal that constitutes
influence, not the signaling itself. This is why inactive neurons
carry influence, not just active ones.
But now: what exactly is meant by “signaling” or “broadcasting”? Clearly, an inactive neuron is not firing or spiking—i.e.
generating action potentials—and it is commonly assumed that
neurons communicate only via spikes. So, an obvious interpretation is that a signaling neuron is a spiking neuron, so that an
inactive neuron is one that is not currently spiking but is ready
to do so, and an inactivated neuron is one that is not ready to
spike.
Here, we come to the key issue. Grant that an inactive neuron
still has the baseline activity necessary to maintain spike readiness. This activity does not itself produce consciousness. However,
such a neuron could also be engaged in a lot of other sub-threshold
activity: more than just maintaining a membrane potential, yet
not causing an action potential. Graded potentials are the obvious
example, and such sub-threshold activity may be relevant to consciousness. Two pioneers of the neural correlates of consciousness
program, one of whom is now Tononi’s collaborator, more than 30
years ago wrote that the relevant neural activity might include
“not only neurons that fire action potentials but also non-spiking
neurons such as amacrine cells” (Crick and Koch 1990, 266). There
are also theories (John 2001; McFadden 2020) on which consciousness depends on the electromagnetic fields generated by neural
activity—not necessarily limited to spiking activity. In relation to
these theories, it is worth noting that some recent studies (some
featuring, again, Tononi’s collaborator) suggest that neurons influence each other via their electrical fields (Anastassiou and Koch
2015; Faber and Pereda 2018). My point is not that these theories are correct, but that we cannot assume that spikes are the
only activity that matters to consciousness. So, Tononi’s advertised claim that inactive neurons contribute to consciousness
might, on examination, become the far less counterintuitive claim
that certain kinds of sub-threshold neural activity contribute to
consciousness.
The issue boils down to this. Tononi might be making either of
the following two claims about consciousness in the brain:
Claim (1): Consciousness can be produced by the occurrence
of non-spiking activity.
Claim (2): Consciousness can be produced purely by the
absence of spiking activity.

The assumption that neural elements that are active are broadcasting information often goes hand in hand with the corollary
that inactive elements are essentially doing nothing, since they
are not broadcasting anything. According to the IIT, this is not
correct. (Balduzzi and Tononi 2009, 14)
[The silent brain prediction] contrasts with the common
assumption that neurons only contribute to consciousness if
they are active in such a way that they “signal” or “broadcast”
the information they “represent.” (Tononi 2017, 252)

Similar remarks appear in Oizumi et al. (2014), Tononi (2015),
Tononi and Koch (2015), and Tononi et al. (2016). The clear implication is that an active neuron is one that is signaling to other
neurons. An inactive neuron would then be one that is able to
signal but is not currently doing so; and an inactivated neuron,
one that is unable to signal. The abstract IIT principle that an element contributes to consciousness only if it is influencing other
elements would translate into the applied principle that a neuron contributes to consciousness only if it is able to signal other

The difference is subtle, but it matters to the disabling and SB
predictions. On (1), the two predictions are testable; but on (2),
I shall argue, they are not. This is because on (1), the neural state
that produces a conscious experience can also be the triggering
cause of a subject’s response to that experience. However, on (2),
this is ruled out because any activity that might be involved is
irrelevant to the production of consciousness. All that is relevant is that there is no spiking activity, for that is what makes
it the case that it is in element state 𝛽 (“off”/“inactive”) rather
than 𝛼.
So, which claim is Tononi making? I confess I am not completely sure. However, I think he should be making Claim (2), and
there is evidence that this is what he and his colleagues intend.
First, IIT itself allows for (2), not just (1). So far as IIT itself is
concerned, a neuron can be as inert as you like and still contribute
to consciousness, so long as it remains able to transition to its
other information-theoretic state(s). IIT certainly does not require,
for example, that neurons must be engaged in graded potentials,
or producing an electromagnetic field of a certain strength, in
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order to contribute to conscious experience. So, it would be surprising if IIT’s proponents were to limit themselves to (1). This
limitation would largely strip the disabling and SB predictions of
their counterintuitiveness and without motivation from IIT itself.
Second, if Tononi et al. actually have (1) in mind, it is odd that
they never emphasize that the neurons they refer to as “inactive”
are in fact active at sub-threshold levels. Indeed, one might expect
them to not refer to them as “inactive” at all, as this would be misleading. As I have said, they acknowledge that these neurons must
be active at baseline, but this is put forward as a mere enabling
condition, not a component of consciousness itself.
Third, some things Tononi et al. say about the disabling prediction suggest that they are thinking of Claim (2). The disabling event
entails the neurons in question switching from an inactive to an
inactivated state. On Claim (1), that switch would be from a state
of sub-threshold activation to a much lower-activation state. However, this is not how the disabling event is described. Recall that
Tononi et al. (2016) say that one can merely disable the connections between the neurons; thus, there is no need to change the
activation of the neurons themselves. Tononi and Koch (2015) also
imply that there is no such activation change. They say that if the
neurons were “pharmacologically or optogenetically inactivated,
they would cease to contribute to consciousness [because] even
though their actual state is the same, they would not specify a causeeffect repertoire” (p. 10, emphasis added). This suggests that the
only change is to the neurons’ role in a cause–effect network, not
to their actual activity.
From here on, then, I will assume that Tononi et al. have in mind
Claim (2). We now turn to the question of testing the SB prediction.

Testing the SB prediction?
In order to test the SB prediction, we will obviously need a subject
who is actually in the SB state. This in itself may prove to be a
major challenge.
Note further that it would not suffice for a subject to occupy the
SB state only for a few milliseconds. Even if a response was reliably
given whenever the state was momentarily attained, it would be
impossible to determine with confidence whether it was caused
by the SB state itself or by some active state that immediately
preceded or succeeded it. Therefore, we would need the subject
to remain in the SB state for at least several seconds and ideally
for something like a minute.
The first problem, then, as Tononi has sometimes recognized
(Balduzzi and Tononi 2009), is that it may not be possible for a
brain to sustain a state in which all neurons are resting. Indeed,
it may not be possible for a brain to enter the SB state at all; or
perhaps, any brain that does so would not survive. If so, then the
SB prediction is conclusively untestable.
For the sake of argument, however, let us assume that it is
indeed possible for a brain to enter the SB state for a significant
period and survive. Next is the question of how to induce the SB
state. As noted earlier, Tononi et al. suggest that it might be achievable via deep meditation. Otherwise, an artificial process would be
needed, perhaps akin to today’s anesthetic procedures. Again, let
us assume that some such procedure can be devised.
Finally: how we are to know for sure when the SB state
has been fully achieved? This, too, is probably beyond our current capabilities. Let us assume, however, that at some future
date, we will have the requisite neurophysiological measurement
capabilities.
Suppose, then, that we have a subject who can either enter the
SB state of their own accord or is willing to be induced into it. We
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would then arrange for the subject to signal their consciousness
during the SB state. A simple discrimination task would do. Thus,
we give the subject a button. We tell them that once their brain
is silent, we will deliver one of two clearly distinct cues: say, a
musical tone or the click of a ballpoint pen. They should press
the button only when they hear (say) the click; they should ignore
the tone. A test sequence might involve 20 trials. In 10 randomly
selected trials we present the click; in the other 10, the tone. In
each trial, the selected cue is presented only after the subject has
maintained the SB state for at least 10 s. The cue is then presented
at a randomly selected time within the next 10 s.
One might worry that it is unreasonable to expect a voluntary behavioral response from the subject. Such a worry would be
groundless, however. While the SB state may superficially resemble a vegetative state, there is no (non-question-begging) reason
to think that the former would impair the initiation of voluntary actions. Unlike a vegetative patient, a silent-brained subject
has no brain damage. An impairment to voluntary action would
presumably entail that some neurons are disabled, contrary to
Tononi’s own description of the SB scenario.
However, we now come to the key question: can we expect
any response at all from a person whose brain is genuinely
silent?
I do not think we can. The very conditions of the test make a
valid positive response impossible. If the subject is genuinely in
the SB state, they cannot make a response that would be evidence
of consciousness.
Suppose that a particular test sequence produces the following
results. On each of the 10 trials in which a click is presented, the
subject presses the button within 1 s. On each of the 10 trials in
which the tone (the distractor stimulus) is presented, the subject
makes no response.
Suppose we say that this set of responses is evidence of consciousness. Then we are saying that the button presses were
caused by the subject’s having discriminated the two possible
cues, and having decided that since a click was heard they should
press the button. However, a response with this kind of causal origin entails not only a muscle contraction as a proximate cause
but also a preceding activation in the somatic nervous system; and
before that, activation in the motor cortex; and before that, activation of many other brain regions responsible for receiving the cue
and deciding to respond to it.2 None of this is compatible with the
subject having an SB. Ex hypothesi we assume that on each trial, the
subject is in the SB state right up until the presentation of the cue.
Therefore, we should conclude that the cue raised the subject out
of the SB state and that that was what caused the response—not
the SB state itself. By analogy, you may wake a sleeping person by
saying their name, but this does not show that they were conscious
while asleep; only that there are processes that allow stimuli to
rouse a sleeping person to consciousness. It is not thereby shown
that the subject was already conscious before the cue was delivered. Similarly, our subject’s responses do not show that they were
already conscious while in the SB state.
Let me consider some objections.

Objection: the brain is not completely silent
The subject’s brain is active at baseline—the neurons are maintaining a membrane potential. That activation could cause the
button press.

2
In fact, at least in the normal state of affairs, voluntary actions appear to
arise not from an orderly, linear sequence of neural events but from a dynamic
interaction between decision and action processes (Schurger and Uithol 2015).
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Reply
It is true that the brain remains active in the SB state. The background conditions that enable consciousness remain in place.
However, those conditions are defined as merely enabling consciousness, not producing it:
[Background conditions] are the distal or proximal enabling
factors that must be present for any conscious experience to
occur—the heart must beat and supply the brain with oxygenated blood, various nuclei in the midbrain reticular formation and brainstem must be active, cholinergic release needs to
occur within the cortico-thalamic complex, and so on. (Tononi
and Koch 2015, 2)

This objection, therefore, says that the button presses in response
to clicks are caused just by the background activation of the subject’s brain—not by any activity that occurred subsequent to the
cue. This is like saying that a burglar alarm was triggered just by
the steady flow of electricity being delivered to the alarm as of its
being turned on (say, 3 hours ago), not by the activity in the system that occurred after it detected motion. Background conditions
are required simply to keep the brain alive and functional so that
its cortical states can specify cause–effect repertoires that generate conscious experiences. Background conditions are (relatively)
constant. Therefore, they cannot alone cause or explain an adventitious piece of behavior in response to a stimulus, because they
do not vary with the receipt of the stimulus—just as the electrical
power cannot alone explain the triggering of the burglar alarm.
Recall also from earlier that we are assuming that the important feature of inactive or silent neurons is the absence of spiking
activity, not the presence of various kinds of non-spiking activity.
So, there can be no implicit appeal here to, say, the role of graded
potentials.

Objection: passive causation
The SB state could passively cause a response. Consider what
Schaffer (2000) calls “causation by disconnection,” in which an
event occurs because of the disconnection or removal of something that was preventing it. As Schaffer explains, muscle contractions are caused in a way akin to the way a gun is caused to fire. In
the gun, the pulling of the trigger releases a catch (the “sear”) that
was holding back the hammer. Similarly, in skeletal muscle, the
arrival of a nerve signal removes a sheath that was preventing two
sets of protein filaments from binding; and when those filaments
bind, the muscle contracts. There could be many such causal “disconnections” in the chain of energy transfer between an action’s
cortical origin and the action itself. In particular, much causation
in the brain will involve neurons that are not firing because an
inhibitory neuron is preventing them from doing so. Of course, so
far as we know, an inhibitory neuron must itself be firing in order
to perform its function; so inhibition, as ordinarily conceived, cannot occur in an SB. However, what if there are actions that are in
some way passively inhibited in the SB state, similarly to how the
sheath passively inhibits muscle contractions? Then, the arrival
of a cue might remove the inhibition, allowing the action to occur.
Thus, an active response might be caused by a passive brain state.

could not plausibly count as the result of conscious volition, and
thus, it could not plausibly count as evidence that the subject was
conscious while in the SB state.
Suppose that the subject transitions out of the SB state on
receipt of the cue and then presses the button. We then cannot
rule out that the response was caused by the activity that followed
the cue, rather than by the SB state itself, and so the response will
not be evidence of consciousness in the SB state. Instead, it will
more plausibly be evidence of consciousness after the subject has
left the SB state, following receipt of the cue.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the subject remains in the SB
state but still somehow presses the button. This means that there
could be no processing of the cue in preparation for a response,
and so it is not plausible that the subject decided to press the
button. The response could only be an immediate and necessary
consequence of the cue—akin to the firing of a gun or the contraction of a muscle, as in Schaffer’s (2000) examples—and would
thus appear to be more of an unconscious reflex than a conscious
voluntary action.
The basic problem is that since one of two different responses is
required (one of them being a passive or null response), and since
the subject’s brain must play a central causal role in determining which response is made, the subject’s brain must transition
into one of at least two different states as a causal precursor to
making the appropriate response (i.e. pressing the button or the
null response of inaction). However, their brain must therefore
engage in some sort of adventitious activity in order to change its
state—and so the subject cannot remain in the SB state.

Objection: neurophysiological measures
We should use a neurophysiological measure of consciousness
instead of a behavioral one.

Reply
Even aside from the fact that neurophysiological measures are
dependent on the prior establishment of a behavioral measure
(cf. Irvine 2013), the only sign of consciousness we could possibly detect would simultaneously be a sign that the subject was no
longer in the SB state.

Objection: dispense with cues
We should just train the subjects to recognize for themselves
when they are in the SB state and to press the button once they
reach it.

Reply
This does not escape the problem. Obviously, motor cortex activation is still necessary in order for the response to be delivered.
There must also be some other prior activation corresponding to
the subject’s decision that they are now in the SB state and thus
that they should now press the button. So, even if we set up the
test so that the subject has to “self-cue” their response, this does
not make a substantive difference. (It is also questionable whether
a silent-brained subject would be able to self-cue a response.)

Reply

Objection: appeal to memory

It is sheer speculation that certain actions are passively inhibited
in the SB state and that a specific cue (like a click) could release
the inhibition. However, let us grant the premise. Furthermore,
grant the metaphysical claim that the resulting response could be
caused by the SB state. Even so, I contend that such a response

The challenge here is surely not so different from the one faced
in dream research, so surely it can be surmounted in the same
way. We cannot ask a subject about their experience while they
are dreaming, but we can still ask them immediately after they
awake. Could we not do the same for a silent-brained subject?
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Reply
This does not avoid the fundamental problem. The “delayed
report” method works only if the subject, during the dream,
encodes memories that they can later call up. However, encoding a memory requires the brain to undergo a change of some
kind, so as to create the necessary neurological trace. Such traces
can, of course, be created during dreaming, when the brain is very
active. However, if the subject’s brain is silent, then a trace cannot be created, for reasons like those given in my replies to the
first two objections—the SB state rules out adventitious changes
in the brain. So if the subject were to recall something afterward,
it would only show that they had not consistently been in the SB
state. (Remember, again, that we are assuming that sub-threshold
activation is not relevant to consciousness; so, the IIT proponent
cannot suggest that an experiential memory was created by such
activation.)3
In sum, I find none of these objections compelling. I therefore maintain that the SB prediction is untestable, for the simple
reason that the SB state itself makes a valid test impossible.

Testing the disabling prediction?
One might be more optimistic about testing the disabling prediction, given the less extreme neurophysiological conditions that are
required. However, this optimism is misplaced.
To implement the testing procedure, we need a brain region—
call it R—that is silent. Recall Tononi (2004, 19): “If an inactive
element contributing to ‘seeing red’ were removed, blue would not
be experienced as blue anymore.” So, let us imagine that R is a
region that contributes to the subject’s visual experience of red;
but they are seeing a homogeneous blue screen, so the neurons in
R have only resting, or baseline, activation. Then, at a particular
time t, we disable or inactivate R. The prediction is that at t the
subject’s conscious experience will change.
While perhaps less taxing than preparing a test of the SB prediction, preparing a test of the disabling prediction clearly still
requires knowledge and techniques that we do not currently possess. We would need a way to precisely track the physiological
state of well-defined brain regions in real time. We would also
need a way to temporarily (and safely) disable a small brain region.
For now, we can implement such deactivation only at a very gross
level.4 Tononi and Koch (2015) suggest that it might be achieved
by pharmacological or optogenetic means. Cryostasis might also
be suitable if the freezing is reversible.
Let us suppose that the methodological challenges can be
overcome. The prediction says that at t, the moment of R’s disablement, the subject would undergo a change in their color experience. We would therefore instruct them to respond—perhaps,
again, by pressing a button—if they notice any such change. As
with the SB prediction, we could run a sequence of 20 trials. Each
trial could last for, say, 60 s. In 10 randomly selected trials, we disable R at a randomly selected moment after the first 10 s; in the
other 10 trials, we never disable R. Tononi’s prediction is that the
3
What if the memory encoding mechanisms are not part of the main complex but are in some other part of the brain that is not inactivated? (Thanks to
a reviewer for this suggestion.) In response, first, I am not aware of any direct
reason to think that the memory mechanism might be excluded from the main
complex, so the hypothesis feels a bit ad hoc. Second, and more importantly,
even if we accept the hypothesis, it is unclear how the memory mechanism
could record anything if there are no relevant changes in the part of the brain
it is monitoring.
4
In the Wada test (see, e.g. Abou-Khalil 2007), one brain hemisphere is
anesthetized by injecting sodium amobarbital via the internal carotid artery.
Such an intervention is not suited for testing the disabling prediction, as it
affects much too large a swath of the brain, a lot of which would have been
active immediately prior to anesthesia.
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subject should reliably press the button within a second or two of
each disabling event (or at the very least, that they should do so
significantly more often than at times when the disabling event
has not occurred).
The key question is whether the subject would be able to notice
that the disabling event had occurred and thus report on it.5
Although the situation here is more complex than it was for the
SB prediction, I think the same basic problem applies. Ex hypothesi region R is silent until t. Then, at t, it becomes disabled. Recall
(from section “Distinguishing active, inactive, and inactivated neurons” above) that this disabling event ideally involves no change
to activation in R itself. It just means that R, whatever it may be
doing after t, no longer influences the state of other neurons. Now,
as in the SB scenario, any response from the subject would entail
muscle contractions, which in turn would require a preceding activation in the somatic nervous system and (before that) the motor
cortex. In much the same way that it seems impossible for such a
cascade to be initiated by the SB state, it seems impossible for it to
be initiated by the disabling of R. The only way that the disabling
event could trigger the necessary cascade is if, before t, R had been
in some way affecting (some part of) the rest of the brain so that
that effect was abruptly cut off at t. However, R’s having such an
effect before t is inconsistent with its inactive state.
To be sure, according to IIT, R was exerting an influence over
the rest of the brain before t due to its readiness to signal other
neurons—which means it was in informational state 𝛽 rather than
𝛼, to use my neutral terminology. That informational state was
exerting a constraint over the past and future states of the system. However, we are here concerned with neurophysiology, not
information, and at the neurophysiological level, there is no explanation for why the disabling of R should cause the subject to
respond at all.
Strikingly, Tononi himself has indicated that the disabling event
would have no effect on a subject’s behavior. In a recent article, he
presents the disabling prediction as follows:
IIT predicts that a particular brain area can contribute to
experience even if it is inactive, but not if it is inactivated.
For example, if one were presented with a plate of spinach
drained of color, green-selective neurons in the color areas
would remain inactive. Thus, one would experience and report
strange spinach that is gray rather than green. By contrast, if
the same area were not just inactive, but inactivated due to a
local lesion, the phenomenal distinctions corresponding to colors would be lacking altogether. While presumably one would
still report that the spinach is “gray,” in this case “gray” cannot
mean the same as when color areas are intact, i.e. not green,
not red, and so on. (Tononi 2015)

The subject’s color experience would change: “‘gray’ cannot mean
the same as when color areas are intact” (compare Tononi 2004,
as I quoted earlier: “blue would not be experienced as blue anymore”). One would then expect the subject’s report to reflect
that change. While they may find their new experience hard to
describe (“It’s colored but not colored… It’s like the space behind
my head!”), they would not just continue to say, “It’s gray.” Yet,
Tononi appears to state that indeed this is exactly what they would

5
One might worry that the change may be too subtle to be noticed
and reported on. However, this worry seems unmotivated. There is no (nonquestion-begging) reason to think that the disabling event we are imagining has
to be subtle. Indeed, the way Tononi himself has described it makes it sound like
it should be very obvious.
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do. He writes that the subject would “still report that the spinach
is ‘gray”’ after the green-selective neurons were disabled.
If what Tononi himself says here is right, then the disabling
prediction is untestable. Despite the change in the subject’s experience, there can be no change in their behavioral response—
because (I have argued) there is no relevant change in the activity
in their brain.
Nevertheless, defenders of IIT may advance some of the same
objections they offered against my argument concerning the SB
prediction. Let me briefly address these.

Objection: the brain is not completely silent
Again, one might try to argue that R’s baseline activation could
have caused the response.

Reply
Again, this is fruitless. Baseline activation only preserves
metabolism and functionality. It cannot be the cause of a discrete
piece of behavior, and we have already ruled out other varieties
of sub-threshold activation (see the section “Distinguishing active,
inactive, and inactivated neurons”).

Objection: passive causation
Perhaps R’s baseline activation inhibits the activation of other
brain regions so that, when R is disabled, the inhibition is released,
triggering a cascade of activation that leads to the subject pressing
the button.

Reply
It is not clear that this is compatible with the stipulation that the
disabling event involves no change in R itself. For example, if R
does not change, how could it go from inhibiting some other event
to not inhibiting that event? However, let us accept that the scenario is possible, albeit unlikely. Still, as with the passive causation
objection in the SB case, a response generated in this way could
not plausibly indicate a conscious volition.

Objection: appeal to memory
We should have the subject recall any changes in their experience
after the test is completed, rather than expecting them to respond
at the time.

Reply
A delayed response is still just as problematic as an immediate
one. Suppose the subject does indeed recall a change in their
experience at about the time R was disabled, and suppose we are
confident that this report reflects an actual change in their experience at that time. We still must ask: what enabled the subject
to make this report? The only reasonable answer is that some
neurological trace—a memory—of the change was created at the
time. However, how did that happen? We now face the same basic
problem as before: if region R had been genuinely silent, then its
disabling at t could not have caused the creation of a memory
trace. The only way this could have occurred is if R was not silent
after all, thus invalidating the test.

Concluding observations
The disabling prediction and the SB prediction are not testable.
They cannot provide evidence that silent neurons can contribute
to consciousness.
Of course, this is not to say that silent neurons cannot contribute to consciousness. For all I have argued, it remains possible

that they do. It remains possible, that is, that disabling some inactive neurons can change a person’s conscious experience, and
even that a brain whose neurons are all inactive might still support
conscious experience.
Interestingly, in his 2015 article—the same one, ironically, in
which I think he effectively admits that the disabling prediction
is untestable—Tononi distinguishes between “predictions” of IIT
and “extrapolations” of IIT. In the latter category, he seems to put
claims that are not testable, such as the claim that “a simple but
large two-dimensional grid of appropriate physical elements could
be highly conscious, even if it were doing ‘nothing’ (all binary elements off), and even if it were disconnected from the rest of the
world.” It is surprising that, having made this distinction, he still
categorizes the claims about the role of silent neurons as predictions. It seems to me that they would be much better categorized
as extrapolations.
As I noted earlier, IIT is not alone in these commitments regarding silent neurons. Some may say that a theory that implies
that neurons can contribute to consciousness while doing nothing thereby provides its own reductio. However, it is unclear how
much weight we should give to intuition here. Schwitzgebel (2014)
argues that the correct metaphysics of the mind will inevitably be
contrary to common sense. Despite the weirdness of IIT’s claim
about the role of inactive neurons, it remains possible that, in the
end, we will have to accept it.
However, not, I think, just yet. In closing, let me point out a
curious aspect of Tononi’s position which might give us pause.
I have noted that Tononi et al. have often speculated that the
SB state might be a state of “pure” or “naked” conscious awareness,
devoid of content. However, I do not think that IIT itself supports
this speculation. In suggesting it, Tononi et al. reveal an implicit
commitment to a more significant role for neural activation than
their theory allows.
The common intuition is that if one’s brain is doing nothing,
then one’s mind would also be doing nothing. However, IIT’s proponents do not see it this way. This is because of their belief that
an inactive neuron can carry as much information as an active
one; so that it can contribute as much to the subject’s conscious
experience as an active one.
So far, so good—albeit counterintuitive. However, Tononi et al.
then speculate that the conscious experience of the SB state would
be one of nothingness. This is surprising. From an informational
perspective, the SB state is simply one among the vast number
of states that a brain can occupy. A priori, there is no reason to
have any particular expectation about the phenomenology of that
state—any more than there would be for any other state we might
select. Why could the SB state not produce, say, an experience
of deep happiness? Or of a full-body itch? Or of warmth? Or of
nausea?
I think that Tononi et al. are tacitly yielding to the pull of the
common intuition noted above. Even though they claim that a
silent-brained subject would be conscious, their speculation that
the subject would nonetheless have a null or empty phenomenology is a symptom of the pull of the intuition. IIT itself provides no
reason for that speculation.
Also telling is the IIT theorists’ frequent suggestion that the
SB state might be achieved through meditation. Partly, no doubt,
they make this suggestion because of the expectation that the SB
state would be a state of pure awareness.6 Yet, there is no evidence

6
Many forms of meditation actually involve focusing one’s awareness on a
particular thing, such as the breath. A state of pure awareness is the goal only
of a few varieties, such as Daoist apophatic meditation (e.g. Roth 2015).
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that a state of pure awareness correlates with anything like the SB
state.7
Perhaps also contributing to the apparent connection between
meditation and the SB state is the fact that meditation characteristically involves motionlessness, combined with the intuition
that a silent-brained subject would have to be motionless. I have
argued, of course, that this intuition is correct and that it makes
a test of the SB prediction impossible. One might therefore expect
Tononi to resist this intuition, as doing so would more easily allow
for responses from a silent-brained subject. Yet, his association
of the SB state with meditation suggests that he assumes that a
silent-brained subject would indeed be inert. Again, I see nothing
in IIT itself which requires this assumption. If, e.g. the SB state
were to produce extreme itchiness (and again, IIT offers no reason
why it could not), then a silent-brained subject might be expected
to be constantly scratching.
It might now be pointed out that what I have just said is exactly
why we should think that the SB state must be associated with
an empty phenomenology. For how could a silent-brained subject possibly be scratching? And if they cannot possibly scratch,
then how can they possibly feel an itch—or, indeed, anything? Isn’t
pure awareness without content the only phenomenology that is
compatible with the subject’s serene unresponsiveness?
However, this line of thought is at least as good an argument
for the conclusion that a silent-brained subject would be unconscious as it is for the conclusion that they would experience pure
awareness. My point here is that there is no reason to associate the
SB state with a meditative state; and the fact that Tononi and colleagues make that association betrays their own tacit sense that
there is, after all, something unusual about the SB state that is not
captured by IIT itself.
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